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Names Are Not Predicates
Abstract: Many examples are offered as evidence that proper names function as predicates. 
Not all of these cases speak to a name’s semantic content, but many of them do. Some of 
these include what will be called “attributive,” “quantifier,” and “ambiguity” cases. We will 
explore those cases here, and we will see that none of them conclusively show that names 
are predicates. In fact, all of these constructions can be given alternative analyses that 
eliminate the predicative characteristics of the names they feature. In attributive cases, the 
names within them are to be understood as occurring in a comparative construction, not an 
attributive construction. In the last two types of cases, the names that occur are analyzed as 
part of a syntactically complex, but semantically simple referential device used to pick out a 
specific domain, rather than functioning as predicates that combine with determiners to 
compositionally determine their extensions. Both paraphrases can be given plausible 
semantic treatments that have significant advantages over their competitors. For this 
reason, there is less motivation to focus on predicative views of proper names.  
1. Introduction
Current debates about the semantic content, or meaning, of proper names center around 
two contrasting views about their nature. The first view, known as the predicative view, 
offers an analysis of names as expressions that have properties as their semantic content.  1
The second view, known as the referentialist view, offers an analysis of names as 
expressions whose semantic content are singular individuals. Both views are justified, since 
there is conflicting data supporting each of them equally well. A defender of a predicative 
account, then, needs to explain how and why proper names are used referentially, whereas 
a defender of a referentialist account needs to explain how and why name are used 
predicatively. 
There have been numerous developments of both the predicative and the 
referentialist views, the details of which we will not go into here. The aim here is not to 
 I assume throughout that the semantic value of a predicate is a property of some sort. This is 1
done merely for economy of expression. The points here go through independent of any 
particular conception of the semantic value of a predicate. 
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evaluate any particular view of names, but to instead eliminate the evidence in favor of one 
view over the other. The view rejected on these grounds shall be the predicative view due to 
the availability of an alternative explanations of the typical constructions used to illustrate 
that names are predicates. These alternative explanations will be developed to a certain 
extent and objections considered.  2
2. Names as Predicates: Classical and Contemporary Motivations  
Quine is the first well-known proponent of the idea that names ought to be understood as 
predicates (1953), though he does not develop the idea in any detail. For this reason, his 
work generates at least two separate interpretations of the predicative view of proper 
names. 
On the first interpretation of the predicative view, we can understand name-
predicates as associated with singleton sets — as having as their semantic values 
properties that apply uniquely to a singular individual. The advantages of this view over the 
referentialist view, however, are unclear, save for resolving puzzles concerning negative 
existentials, Quine’s own motivation for introducing the idea in the first place.
According to Quine, names should be treated as predicates because doing so allows 
us to avoid the traditional problems associated with analyzing the content of empty names. 
Up until Russell’s (1905) claim that names are nothing but disguised definite descriptions, 
the meaning of expressions containing non-referring proper names posed a certain 
metaphysical puzzle. It appeared, that in order to say of Pegasus that it was the winged 
horse of Bellerophon, and to say something sensible and true, Pegasus must in fact exist. 
 There are other constructions that challenge the referentialist view that are not considered. 2
Given that this strategy here is to treat each case one by one, there are only so many cases that 
can be considered at one time. However, the cases we will consider are those most heavily 
relied upon to support predicative accounts, at least up to this point. 
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Even worse, take the negative existential sentence 
(1) Pegasus does not exist.
On the referentialist theory of names prevailing at the time — that names are used as labels 
for singular individuals — a name must refer in order to have meaning. But given the truth of 
sentence (1), and the non-existence of Pegasus, surely this must be a mistake. However, 
as Quine noted, if we treat a name as a predicate, then we can assert sentence (1) without 
paradox. We can say that it is false that there is anything that instantiates the property of 
being Pegasus.
On the second interpretation of the predicative view, we can understand what will be 
termed “name-predicates” as associated with sets containing all of those individuals that 
bear the name in question, along the same lines as common nouns, or properties. The 
motivations for this view include the following: at times, we appear to use names as if they 
indicate a mode of being — as connoting certain properties that we can attribute to 
individuals — instead of simply referring to individuals themselves, thus illustrating that they 
are more than mere tags for singular individuals; we also sometimes use names as if they 
can be bound by quantifiers — as expressions that can take individuals as arguments — 
again showing they are more than mere devices of reference for singular individuals; last, 
sometimes the use of a name can engender which-questions in certain conversational 
contexts — as in which person bears a particular name is under discussion — showing that 
names might be better thought of as common count nouns, not as devices of reference. 
These uses of proper names give us good reasons for thinking of names as predicates, 
even though each type of use is slightly different. In fact, as we’ll see, one of these types of 
uses is somewhat simple to deal with, whereas the other two are not. For this reason, most 
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of the emphasis of the following discussion is on providing a semantic account of the more 
difficult cases, though we will see a semantic account offered for the simpler case as well.
3. Cases for Names as Predicates
Before we look at the substance of the non-predicative treatment of the previously 
mentioned cases, it makes sense to first simply describe them in more detail, explain how 
they show that names are predicates, and illustrate each one with some examples. These 
examples and their interpretation will concern us for the rest of the discussion. It is, 
therefore, important to have a detailed look at each of them. 
3.1 Attributive Cases
The first case, as mentioned, is one in which names appear to function as if they can be 
used to attribute properties to individuals. Take, for instance, the sentence 
(2) The current President of the United States is a real Napoleon,  3
or 
(3) Here comes Lena with her two little Lenas.4
In these sentences, it appears that the names are being used to express properties, not to 
refer to things at all. In sentence (2), ‘Napoleon’ is being used to attribute Napoleon-ness to 
The President of the United States, for surely what’s being said is not that the President of 
the United States is literally identical to Napoleon. Sentence (3), of course, is obviously not 
making an identity claim, as this would clearly violate the laws of equivalence relations. 
Instead, it appears to be attributing Lena-ness to Lena’s two children. 
 See Burge (1973) for pointing out this kind of use of proper names. 3
 See Jeshion (2015a and 2015b). 4
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3.2 Quantifier Cases
At times, we bind names with quantifiers. This suggests that they are in fact predicates, 
since only expressions that can, in principle, apply to more than one object are open for 
quantifier binding. Common examples of this phenomenon are as follows:
(4) All Franks are real chatterboxes 
(5) Some Franks are real chatterboxes
(6) The Frank I know is a real chatterbox
Sentences (4), (5), and (6) treat the names contained within as expressions that can be 
modified by a quantity operator to make explicit how many of those in a specific domain 
have some property or other. In these cases, to indicate that a particular quantity of Frank’s 
have the property of being chatterboxes.
3.3 Ambiguity Cases
Ambiguity cases are those in which there is a group of individuals properly understood as 
belonging to a set to which a certain predicate applies, in which a speaker wishes to pick 
out only one of the members of that group. A sentence that might be used to express the 
problem of ambiguity with respect to a proper name is
(7) That Frank is a real chatterbox.
In this case, we can understand sentence (7) as making it explicit which Frank it is that is in 
fact a chatterbox, not the one sitting quietly taking notes, but that one over there making 
jokes to his friends. The fact that we need to use a determiner to disambiguate between 
Franks indicates that ‘Frank’ is in fact a predicate. 
4. Why Names Are Not Predicates
Now the question is, ought we to take the previous reasons as conclusive for believing that 
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names have as their essence a predicative function? The answer we will now explore is 
negative. For each case that apparently shows that names are predicates, there are 
alternative ways of understanding that case that do not have names playing predicative 
roles at all, even if they are modified by some kind of determiner. We’ll now explore 
alternative analyses of each of the previous cases that eliminate the need to understand 
names as having an essential predicative function altogether. 
4.1 Attributive Cases as Comparatives
Unlike it appears, in attributive cases, in asserting a sentence like (2), that the current 
President of the United States is a real Napoleon, we are not in fact attributing the property 
of being Napoleon to the current President of the United States. Instead, the non-
predicative proposal begins with an individual as the semantic value for our embedded 
proper name ‘Napoleon’, and that individual is understood not as a simple, but instead as a 
set of properties (Montague, 1973).  We can now get a non-predicative compositional 5
formal analysis that represents the content of sentence (2). Instead of understanding a 
sentence like (2) as a subject-predicate sentence, we should instead understand the 'is' in 
such constructions as comparative.  That is, we take the semantic value of the expression 6
‘The current President of the United States’, which happens to designate a specific 
individual, treat that individual as a set of properties — the set of all of those properties the 
current President of the United States has — and then compare those properties with 
Napoleon’s properties. The content of sentence (2) then is understood as comparing the 
 For more defense of this view taking into consideration different issues, see Tiedke (2011).5
 Why appeal to such abstract theories of names such as Montague’s here? Well, if we were 6
focused solely on this case alone, in the end, it would be the theory that applies most 
straightforwardly to the apparent syntax of sentences with this form. 
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properties of the current President of the United States with the properties of Napoleon and 
of saying of those properties that they are similar, or that they overlap. This eliminates the 
predicativist view of names under consideration, since, on this proposal, the semantic value 
of the proper name ‘Napoleon’ is not a first-order predicate in any sense; it does not take 
individuals as an argument, unlike the standard analysis of predicates has it.
Other examples in which we use the expression ‘is’ in a similar comparative fashion 
include constructions like these:
(8) Boating is Heaven,
(9) Necessity is the mother of invention,
(10) Love is not a victory march,
(11) Cleanliness is next to godliness.
Like sentence (2), sentences (8)-(11) also resist a standard predicative analyses of their 
meanings. Sentence (8) neither expresses an identity claim, nor does it express a property 
that boating literally has. Similar things can be said for sentences (9)-(11). Sentence (2), 
then, is not the only example that pushes for sometimes giving a comparative analysis of 
sentences containing the expression ‘is’, many others do as well.7
Now what of sentence (3)? We do not, in this case, simply have two different names 
embedded within it. Rather, we have a more complex construction, ‘two little Lenas’. For this 
reason, we cannot straightforwardly rely on our previous analysis. A different strategy first 
must be invoked. This strategy paraphrases the complex construction in sentence (3) into a 
form that makes each use of each name explicitly represented. Sentence (3) is now 
rendered as having the following form:
 In fact, this analysis could potentially be used to explain the content of metaphors generally.7
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(3)' Here comes Lena1 with little Lena2 and with little Lena3. 
Now we can give a straightforward analysis of (3)' as a comparative relying on our previous 
treatment. That is, we can now assign sets of properties to each of the embedded names as 
their semantic values. So, what we are actually doing in sentence (3) is comparing the 
properties of Lena1 with the properties of the other two individuals temporarily dubbed ‘Lena’ 
in this particular context, even if it is not their true name, and saying that each of them are 
similar — share common properties.
Could we think of the rendition of sentence (3) as merely ad hoc? The answer is 
“no.” Why not? Because no one would assent to having asserted that, in sentence (3), they 
intended to attribute the property of actually being Lena to Lena’s daughters. So the 
sentence naturally calls for reinterpretation. 
4.2 Quantifiers, Ambiguity, and Referential Domain Specifiers
Quantifier and ambiguity cases require significantly different types of treatments from the 
attributive cases, though distinct from one another as well. Our sample quantificational 
sentences (4), (5), and (6) invite us to infer that because we can bind only predicative 
expressions with quantifiers, names must be this sort of expression. Similarly, our ambiguity 
case involving sentence (7) appears to show that a multitude of individuals might share a 
particular name. This again suggests that names are more like predicative expressions than 
originally thought, assuming we take the previous sentences at face value. But suppose we 
don't. 
As we will see, we can altogether eliminate cases of apparent quantificational 
binding of proper names, thereby undermining one specific and very important reason for 
believing names are predicates. We shall reject these cases as illustrating that names are 
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predicates by re-interpreting those quantificational structures so that they are not binding a 
proper name at all, but rather are functioning to specify a domain of discourse, though an 
appeal to some kind of determiner in the analysis is unavoidable. Appealing to these 
determiners however does not make the analysis quantificational, nor predicative. Instead, 
we will understand those determiners conjoined with proper names as a way of forming 
Kripke-style complex names for specific domains of discourse, known as domain specifiers. 
That is, we are now supposing that constructions like ‘All Franks’ are not understood as 
being composed of a quantifier and a predicate, but are understood instead as a complex 
device of reference that actually refers to the set of the Franks.
Next, suppose these domain specifiers do not even contain the use of a proper 
name at all.  To be less abstract, let us look at what a paraphrase of our problem cases 8
might look like. Take sentence (4) All Franks are real chatterboxes. We can paraphrase this 
sentence as 
(4)' Of those people named ‘Frank’: they are real chatterboxes. 
Mutatis mutandis for sentence (5). ‘Some Franks are real chatterboxes’ becomes:
(5)' Of one or more people named ‘Frank’: they are real chatterboxes.9
Sentence (6) ‘The Frank I know is a real chatterbox’ we can paraphrase in the following 
way:
(6)' Of a person I know named ‘Frank’: he is a real chatterbox.
 Although this is unnecessary, given the non-compositional nature of domain specifiers in the 8
analysis, it makes it abundantly clear that it is not the name ‘Frank’ that is being analyzed. 
 Similar to the use of mentioned, rather than used names, leaving out the standard quantifiers 9
is not essential. It is done simply to avoid misinterpretation and confusion, and to make the 
semantic claim about how to understand the paraphrases line up more clearly with the 
syntactical structure of the paraphrases.
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Lastly, sentence (7) — ‘That Frank is a real chatterbox' — becomes
(7)' Of that person named ‘Frank’: he is a real chatterbox.
These syntactic reconfigurations will allow us to paraphrase away the apparent evidence 
that names are predicates.
But, at this point, our syntactic reconfigurations are merely that — syntactic 
reconfigurations. We have yet to provide a semantic analysis of them. And nothing has 
been said about the relationship between the original construction and its reconfigured 
version. Of course, given the stated goal of eliminating a predicativist account of proper 
names, there is only one thing to say about the second of these issues — that our 
paraphrases, whatever their semantics might be, must give the actual meanings of their 
paraphrased counterparts. Otherwise, any semantic account of such paraphrases would not 
accomplish our stated goal. Though it is important to note that the analysis offered is not 
intended to correspond isomorphically to the parts of the analysandum. We are not here 
offering an analysis of the meanings of the names within, for example, quantified 
constructions, but rather of the entire quantified construction itself. 
5. The Domain Specifier View of Quantifier and Ambiguity Cases
The semantic account we will consider treats the material antecedent to the pronouns in 
sentences (4)'-(7)' as our previously mentioned domain specifiers, or as explicitly 
referencing a universe of discourse. It treats the pronouns occurring within these sentences 
as anaphoric expressions that have the specified domain as their value, and the predicates 
are functions that take these domains as arguments and map them to true or false, to be 
spelled out in detail a bit later.
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5.1 The Semantics of Domain Specifiers
As before, the initial hypothesis is that the domain specifiers in sentences (4)'-(7)' are to be 
treated as complex devices of reference akin to Kripke’s treatment of complex names like 
‘The Holy Roman Empire’ whose semantic value is not determined compositionally by the 
syntax and meanings of the parts of the expression that make it up.  Instead, the phrase is 10
understood as being used to refer to a particular political entity. Similarly, the material 
antecedent to the pronouns in the previously offered paraphrases of sentences (4)-(7) is 
intended to pick out domains via acts of reference.  It is this core fact that makes the 11
domain specifier view non-predicative in nature. Of course, we need a systematic account 
of how all of the various parts of our reconfigurations interact and contribute to their 
meanings, but first, let us examine whether there are any reasons to believe that we ought 
to treat the material antecedent to the pronouns in (4)’-(7)’ as a complex name in Kripke’s 
sense. Once we have established that there are such reasons, we can then return to our 
analysis of the meaning of the entire sentences in question. 
5.2 Motivations for Treating Domain Specifiers as Devices of Reference
Clearly, there are theoretical advantages to thinking of domain specifiers as complex 
names; it allows us to avoid giving an analysis of the mentionings of the names and the 
determiners contained within them. But these are not the only reasons for treating them in 
this way, nor can it be, since mere theoretical advantages are insufficient to warrant belief in 
 But isn’t whether names function in the way Kripke argues the very idea at issue? How then 10
can I rely on this idea? Well, I can rely on this idea because I am not claiming that the relevant 
domain specifiers are proper names as we identify them syntactically in the language, but rather 
that they are devices of reference — logically proper names — the existence of which is not 
something the predicativist is out to deny, at least, not most. 
 For arguments that even quantified noun phrases ought to be understood referentially, see 11
Purver and Ginzburg (2004).
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a theory, given that such motivations are ad hoc without further independent motivations 
coming from outside the theory itself. An independent reason for thinking that domains can 
and do serve as referents is that they are individuals in their own right. Another independent 
reason involves our intuitions about the semantic reference of the relevant domain 
specifiers. And a last independent reason relies on our intuitions about the modal profiles of 
sentences containing specific domain specifiers. 
5.2.1 Domains as Objects of Reference
Can we treat domain specifiers as complex devices of reference? Why not? There is no 
reason for thinking that we cannot pick out domains by referring to them equally as well as 
we can anything else. Still, simply because we can do something, does not mean we 
should, or that we do. So why should we treat such complex phrases like ‘Of those people 
named ‘Frank’:’ as devices of reference? One reason is that we can and do refer to 
domains of discourse as entities in their own right. To simplify things, for now let us think of 
a domain of discourse as a set. In set theory, we usually use qualitative conditions, or 
properties, to define the boundaries of a set, determined by the individuals satisfying those 
conditions or having certain properties. These are the individuals who count as members of 
that set. If we have a nominalist bent, it is tempting to conclude that sets have no existence 
independent of their members and the properties of those members. However, just a simple 
glance at Leibniz’s Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals shows that sets are not merely 
individuated by their members, since sets can have properties that individuals do not and 
vice versa.  A set, for instance, has a cardinality, but its members need not. The singleton 12
set containing Frank as a member, has the cardinality number 1, but Frank does not. 
 Assume, for now, that there are atomic elements of sets that are not themselves sets. 12
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Likewise, Frank has the property of being a smoker, but the set containing him certainly 
does not.  Sets, then, appear to have their own identity conditions that are independent of 13
their members, and so there is more to a set’s identity than a mere qualitative specification 
of its members can capture. Sets are individuals in their own right, and individuals in their 
own right are those to which we can refer. 
This previous line of reasoning does not, of course, prove that our domain specifiers 
are indeed complex devices of reference, only that they could be, that domains are apt for 
being named.  To show that we, in fact, ought to treat our particular domain specifiers as 14
complex devices of reference, we must turn to other considerations.
5.2.2 Domain Specifiers and The Semantic Role of Complex Names
To offer some evidence that our domain specifiers are functioning as devices of reference 
akin to Kripke’s complex names, let us now turn to some arguments from Kripke himself, 
and reconsider sentence (4)' Of those people named ‘Frank’: they are real chatterboxes. 
Suppose we misidentified the group of people named ‘Frank’. The individuals we 
thought were named ‘Frank’ were really named ‘Harry’, and they were the real 
chatterboxes. The individuals who were actually named ‘Frank’ were in fact quietly reading 
books. Now, what do we want to say in this situation? We have two options. The first is to 
evaluate sentence (4)' as not having been about the domain we thought it was about — it 
was actually about another domain and what we said about that domain was false. The 
second option is to say of the domain specifier that, even though we did not identify the 
 Though this point may seem obvious to most, it comes to play an important role later.13
 In fact, there is a historical precedence for this idea. Boole (1854) thought that domains 14
should be thought of as ultimate subjects. And, later, Montague (1973) pushed the idea that 
even individuals should be thought of as sets, things we uncontroversially name all the time.
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correct domain by description, that domain specifier nevertheless still refers to the set of 
individuals who are real chatterboxes. Call the first option, the predicativist response, and 
the second option the referential response. 
If the hypothesis that our domain specifiers are functioning as devices of reference is 
correct, we should expect the referential response to prevail. Does it? Well, imagine a 
teacher attempting to point out to a class monitor a particular set of students who need to 
be disciplined. In this case, we would say that we were still talking about the group of 
chatterboxes, even though our manner of referring to them was mistaken. This example 
shows that, at least sometimes, our domain specifiers function as devices of reference. And 
the hypothesis is that in cases in which names are mentioned in domain specifiers, this is 
always the way they should be interpreted. 
Nevertheless, this is not conclusive evidence. There are conversations in which the 
predicative response appears to be correct. For example, we can imagine a conversation in 
which people are deciding what to name their child, and someone tells them not to name 
them ‘Frank’, because all Franks are real chatterboxes. In this case, it seems the 
predicativist intuition prevails, since in this case, we are specifically interested in whether 
the group of Franks are real chatterboxes. 
To find more conclusive evidence in favor of the referentialist hypothesis, then, we 
must turn to another argument of Kripke’s. Specifically, we need to examine his modal 
argument in the context of the domain specifier view. 
5.2.3 Domain Specifiers and Modal Profiles
Let us now consider the modal profiles of quantified sentences containing proper names, 
and their reinterpretations. Consider the following sentence 
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(12) It is possible that all Franks are not chatterboxes,
which arguably would translate, on the domain specifier view, as the following sentence
(12)' Of those people named ‘Frank’: it is possible that they are not 
chatterboxes.
Intuitively, when we ask about the scenario represented by the above sentences we are 
interested in the properties of the actual people named ‘Frank’, or who are Frank. We are 
not interested in the possibilities for any and all potential persons named ‘Frank’, or who are 
potentially Frank, who may or may not be chatterboxes (assuming, for the sake of 
argument, an unrestricted view of the quantifiers a la Lewis). In other words, the properties 
of other individuals in other worlds that share the name ‘Frank’, or who are Frank, are not 
relevant for evaluating the truth of sentences (12) or (12)’, just as the properties of things 
potentially designated with the term ‘water’ are not relevant for evaluating the truth of modal 
statements about actual water. 
Sentence (12), however, is ambiguous as it is. It is not clear whether to interpret the 
modal operator as operating on the entire set of Franks at the actual world, or the entire set 
of Franks at all worlds, which might vary from those at the actual world, assuming Frank is a 
predicate like any other. This, of course, constitutes a problem for the predicate view, since 
they would need to argue that when dealing with name-predicates, the modal operator 
always takes narrow scope. Likewise, sentence (12)’ is also ambiguous between readings, 
at least it is if we fail to accept that the material antecedent to the modal operator is a 
complex device of reference. However, once we do accept this, we can get the intuitive 
reading without the possibility of any ambiguity, given that there is no room for modal 
operators to create ambiguities in constructions that contain logically proper names. The 
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only individuals that matter for evaluating (12)’ are those referred to in the actual world by 
the domain specifier, and the idea that such domain specifiers are devices of reference 
captures this intuition. This is, then, further evidence that our domain specifiers behave as 
devices of reference.15
5.3 Reference and the Domain Specifier View
Now that we have seen at least some evidence for the idea that the domain specifiers in 
(4)'-(7)' are referential in nature, we need to know in what sense they are referential. We 
also need to understand the relationship between these devices of reference, the pronouns 
that have values assigned to them, and the predicative element of sentences (4)'-(7)'. 
5.3.1 Domain Specifiers, Reference, and Predication
We’ve already seen that sets have different properties from the individuals that compose 
those sets. We have also seen that our domain specifiers refer to sets. The problem that 
arises is that the properties predicated of those sets are not properties that hold of sets, but 
rather properties that hold of the individuals that make up that set. Domains cannot be 
chatterboxes, but of course, individuals can. Therefore, on the domain specifier view, it must 
be the case that when we use domain specifiers to refer, we somehow manage to predicate 
something of the individuals who are members of those domains, whether a multitude of 
individuals, as in the case of sentence (4)', one or more individuals, as in the case of 
sentence (5)', or single individuals as in the cases of sentences (6)' and (7)'.  
To explain how this might work in the case of sentence (4)', we need to examine the 
phenomenon of plural reference, of referring to many things at once. We do so in multitude 
 Of course, this is exactly where the debate about how to understand quantifiers rears its 15
head. If they are to be understood as restricted, then we could get the same modal results as 
we do above. But I do not wish to take a position on this debate here. Sufficed to say that the 
solution offered here nicely sidesteps having to delve into that conflict at all. 
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multitude of ways, but the way that interests us, at least with respect to sentence (4)', is the 
the use of bare plurals. Designating using bare plurals is exemplified in the following 
sentence:
(13) Dogs are barking.
Notice that we are saying of each dog that it is barking and we simply use the bare plural to 
group together those dogs in order to say that each of them is barking. This is in contrast 
with using plurals as generics, which we could do by using this sentence:
(14) Dogs bark. 
In this case, we are not referring to each dog and saying of it that it is barking. Rather, we 
are making a general assertion about the category of dogs and their tendencies. It is not 
this kind of phenomenon in which we are at present taking an interest. 
We can use proper names as bare plurals as well.  Consider this sentence:16
(15) Franks are studiers.17
In this case, we are referring plurally to the Frank’s and saying of each of them that they are 
studiers. Likewise, now that we have evidence that our domain specifiers are indeed 
devices of reference, we should understand the pronouns in sentences like (4)' as making 
plural reference to those named ‘Frank’. If this is correct, then even though we are picking 
out a group of individuals, because we are referring to them plurally, we can make 
assertions about the properties of the members of that plurality. What we have is plural 
 We might be tempted to take this as a further piece of evidence that names are not simple 16
devices of reference once again. But, we need not understand the pluralization of a proper 
names as evidence for the predicative view, so long as we understand the logical form of a 
plural version of a proper name as a conjunction of individually referring names, and when we 
have a set of homophones, we simply use the plural for the sake of convenience. 
 Which of course on the domain specifier view has this structure: Of those named ‘Frank’: they 17
are studiers’.
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reference with distributive predication. Note that we must loosen up our set talk at this point 
in order to accommodate plural reference. We must say that instead of referring to sets, our 
domain specifiers actually refer to a plurality, but they still refer nonetheless.  18
 The same reasoning can be applied to sentence (5)’ as well. The expression 
‘one or more’ is read as plural, and therefore, whatever we say about sentence (4)’ 
simply carries over to sentence (5)’ as well.  19
In the case of sentences (6)' and (7)', we have a case of picking out a domain that 
contains only one member. However, once again, we face the same problem as before. 
Domains cannot be chatterboxes, but individuals can be. And, once again, we will invoke 
the distinction between distributive and collective predication. Normally, this distinction 
applies only to pluralities, perhaps surprisingly, however, we can also apply it to singular 
subjects. For example, a republic can be at war, but can also be divided. If we could not 
read sentences that refer to singular subjects as either collective or distributive, asserting 
that the republic is divided would make little sense. Returning to the specific issues being 
dealt with here, while a domain as a collective object of reference cannot be a chatterbox, 
given its nature, we do have the option of reading the predication as distributive, as applying 
to the member of the domain. We can then get the natural interpretations of sentences (6)' 
and (7)'. 
Of course, our example of a predicate distributing in the case of a singular individual 
 What to say about pluralities is controversial. Can we understand them ultimately as sets or 18
not is a question that has yet to be settled. See Massamiliano et al (2016).
 A sentence like (5)’ might also pick out only one individual as well, but the same reading will 19
apply. Here I am explicitly rejecting the claim that only plurals can have distributive readings as 
claimed by Moltmann (2016). Instead, the collective/distributive reading is understood as the 
difference between talking about a set as such, and talking about the members of that set. 
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required us to be discussing different parts of that singular individual. And there are plenty 
of these kinds of examples, even those that use proper names. Consider the fact that Frank 
can be dead, but can also be Texas, Ontario, and Alabama. We can say this and read the 
locational predicates distributively, but only if we are discussing various parts of Frank. We 
are not doing this when we say, of the Frank I know, that he is a real chatterbox. However, 
when dealing with singleton sets, there must be some difference between different ways of 
predicating properties of the set and of the individual within that set. For example, take the 
country France. As a collective set, it is a republic. But, it is also, as an individual land mass, 
hexagonal. And we can assert both of these things of France. For example, we can utter 
(16) France is a republic and is hexagonal
and convey something meaningful and true. France can be picked out as a collective set 
and have a property predicated of it collectively, but it can also have predicates predicated 
of it that distribute over the contents of that set. Likewise, the claim is that when we utter 
sentences like (6)’ or (7)’, we are picking out the collective set initially, but we can then go 
on to predicate a proper of the individual(s) picked out by the domain specifier, in the same 
way we do when we utter a sentence like (16).
We have now resolved how our domain specifiers can both be referential 
expressions used to pick out domains, and yet how we can also truly predicate certain 
properties of the individuals within those domains.  We are now in a position to explore the 20
truth conditions for sentences (4)’-(7)'.
 Other resources are also available if one should find this treatment rather messy. We could 20
invoke a Montaguesque conception of predication in which a sentence like (4)’ would be true 
just in case the specified domain, a set of sets of sets, contains only sets of sets that contain the 
property of being a chatterbox.  
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5.4 Truth Conditions for Sentences (4)'-(7)'
Now that we have settled how it is possible for our domain specifiers to be about the 
properties of the individuals within those domains, we can now state the truth conditions for 
sentences (4)'-(7)' explicitly. On the domain specifier view, the truth condition or semantic 
value for those sentences involves mapping a domain to the value true or false, either or 
singularly, and distributively. That is, we can think of our plural distributive and our singular 
distributive readings as allowing for our pronouns to function as free variables ranging over 
the individuals of our specified domains. Note that, on this model, no quantification over 
those individuals in the domain of discourse is ever required. Our pronouns get their values 
by direct assignment from the domain itself, specified by the antecedent material in our 
paraphrases of sentences (4)-(7).  
To show this, let us specify the truth condition for sentence 
(4)' Of those people named ‘Frank’: they were chatterboxes. 
To evaluate this sentence for truth, we assign to the now free variable in that sentence each 
person named ‘Frank’. The sentence is true just in case, for each of these assignments, the 
individual assigned to the variable is, in fact, a chatterbox. The truth expressed by this 
sentence is an exhaustive conjunction of a series of singular propositions. While this is, of 
course, the Tarskian truth condition provided for sentences containing universal quantifiers, 
clearly, there is another way of mapping a different syntactic construction to the same truth 
condition that does not rely on a quantifier. Specifically, we can do so if the universe of 
discourse is explicitly specified by the sentence in question. In other words, while quantified 
constructions are true only if the previous truth condition holds, it does not follow that if we 
have the previous truth condition, that we must have a quantified sentence from which it 
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was derived.21
Let us now return to sentence (5)’. As before, we will invoke Tarski’s account of the 
truth conditions for quantified sentences. In this case, we will appeal to the truth condition 
for existentially quantified sentences, in that sentence (5)’ is true just in case at least one or 
more of these Franks is, in fact, a chatterbox. What sentence (5)’ expresses, then, is a 
series of disjunctive statements about a specific domain of discourse.
Considering now sentences (6)’ and (7)’ the truth-condition for sentence 
(6)' Of a person I know named ‘Frank’: he is a real chatterbox
has a different form from that which was applied to sentences (4)’ and (5)’. This time there is 
only one individual in the domain, and therefore, we need assign only that one individual as 
a value to the free variable expressed this time by the pronoun ‘he’. This sentence is true, 
then, only if that person is indeed a chatterbox. The truth expressed is the singular 
proposition that Frank is a chatterbox, by means of an assignment of a value to a variable. 
The very same reasoning applies mutatis mutandis to sentence 
(7)' Of that person named ‘Frank’: he is a real chatterbox
as well.
5.6 The Difference between Explicit Domain Specifiers and Quantifiers
Tarski provided us a way to specify the truth conditions of sentences containing quantifiers 
given a presupposed domain of discourse. What he did not do, however, is prove that such 
truth conditions are uniquely associated with quantified sentences. Arguably, using 
quantifiers is an indirect means for getting at Tarski’s truth conditions, because they tacitly 
 This may require rejecting the claim that identical truth conditions entails synonymy. But we 21
already knew that anyway, as the examples of the sentences ‘That is trilateral’ and ‘That is 
triangular’ showed us long ago.
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rely on a presupposition about a fixed domain of discourse. Indeed, this fact has led some 
to offer a context-sensitive account of the quantifiers (VonFintel, 1994). However, when that 
domain of discourse is made explicit in a sentence, we can apply the Tarskian truth 
conditions for the quantifiers directly to that sentence with no need to get at them indirectly 
via a quantifier. This is the fundamental difference between sentences containing explicit 
domain specifiers and those that merely contain quantifiers.
6. Objections
Of course the domain specifier view, by itself, leaves many questions unanswered. Only a 
limited number of the potential objections to the view can be addressed here — those that 
are fairly obvious. We’ll now explore these objections to the view. 
6.1 The Compositionality Objection
One objection to the domain specifier view is that it does not accurately reflect how we 
determine the extension of the relevant domain specifiers. For instance, a construction like 
‘Of those people named ‘Frank’:’ appears to have its extension determined by the meaning 
of its various parts, and how those parts are combined. But this is not how we determine the 
extension of a complex device of reference. In determining a complex referential 
expression’s extension, we completely ignore its internal structure. To return to an earlier 
example, consider Kripke’s example of the name ‘The Holy Roman Empire’. As Kripke 
(1980) points out, it simply does not follow that because The Holy Roman Empire is so-
called that it is holy, Roman, or an empire. An expression that counts as a referential 
expression a la Kripke does not determine its referent through complex compositional 
operations, and yet, this seems to be true of our domain specifiers.
The objection appears even stronger when we consider the fact that the more 
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complex the conditions become for membership in a domain of discourse, the more 
complex the domain specifier itself will become. Consider this sentence:
(17) All Franks who brought pencils to class passed the exam, and were 
happy about it.
On the domain specifier approach, sentence (17) becomes
(17)' Of those people named ‘Frank’ who brought pencils to class: they 
passed the exam, and they were really happy about it.
As sentence (17) illustrates, language permits very complicated domain specifiers, and the 
current hypothesis is that all of these sorts of specifiers produce complex referential 
expressions in the Kripkean sense invoked here, expressions whose extension is not 
determined compositionally. Consideration of sentences like (17)', however, illustrate that 
this is just not plausible. 
One avenue open to the domain specifier theorist is to maintain that determining the 
referent of an expression is one thing, its semantic value or content, is another. Kripke 
addresses this issue with his concept of fixing the referent of a name, which can take a 
variety of forms, including the use of a complex expression with a compositionally 
determined meaning. To return to an earlier example, reconsider the name ‘The Holy 
Roman Empire’. Suppose that originally the empire called by that name was so-called 
because of its actually being a holy Roman empire. The name got its reference fixed by 
using an expression with a compositionally determined meaning. However, thereafter, that 
meaning no longer served as the content of the complex expression ‘The Holy Roman 
Empire’. Instead, its meaning became atomic, and designated the Holy Roman Empire 
whether it was holy, Roman, or an empire. 
The domain specifier theorist might say, then, that the very same phenomenon 
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characterizes what is occurring when we use domain specifiers like those contained in 
sentences (4)'-(7)'. While initially, those domain specifiers may function compositionally to 
determine their extensions, thereafter, they function as complex referring expressions in the 
Kripkean sense. That is, even though we once fixed the referent by relying on a 
compositional analysis of the domain specifiers occurring in sentences (4)'-(7)', we need not 
be committed to that compositional analysis being an essential part of the subsequent 
semantic content of those domain specifiers. That analysis plays merely a pragmatic, rather 
than a semantic role. 
But now, how do we explain our obviously compositional analysis of the truth 
conditions of sentences (4)’-(7)’? The answer is that while the domain might be fixed 
compositionally, and thereafter referred to in a non-compositional way, once we have that 
domain, we can do with it what we wish. The truth conditions for our sentences (4)’-(7)’ are 
not determined by the compositional nature of the domain specifier. Instead, it is what 
follows the domain specifiers in the paraphrases that determines that we must rely on the 
truth conditions that we do in assessing those sentences for truth. 
6.2 The Slippery Slope Objection
Our next objection asks for a motivation for treating only names in a predicative position as 
domain specifiers. If there is no such motivation, then there is nothing stopping us from 
applying the domain specifier view to all common nouns.  For example, consider this 22
sentence:
(18) All whales are mammals.
As it stands, there is nothing preventing use from rendering sentence (18) as the following:
 Thanks to Gabriel Segal for bringing this to my attention.22
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(18)' Of those individuals called ‘whales’: they are all mammals.
Surely sentence (18)' is implausible as an analysis of sentence (18), and therefore the view 
presented here is implausible as well. 
But the domain specifier view is not committed to sentence (18)' as an analysis of 
sentence (18). There is, in fact, a reason to treat sentences (4)-(7) differently than sentence 
(18); by anyone’s measure, names are not mere common nouns like any other common 
noun. For example, even the predicativist recognizes that names play different syntactic 
roles in the language than other common nouns, such as occurring in the argument position 
of sentences without an explicit quantifier. Because there are these differences, there is no 
reason to think that the domain specifier view applies to all common nouns, since names 
are not like all other common nouns in the first place, or if you are a referentialist, are not 
even common nouns at all. In cases like these, it is appropriate to extract such “properties” 
from their predicative position, make their metalinguistic nature explicit, and to locate them 
in a domain specifier position, unlike standard common nouns.
Another variant on the previous objection is to appeal only to constructions 
embedding names.  Consider, for instance, this sentence:23
(19) Frank is happy.
The previous response just offered will not apply in this case due to its containing a proper 
name. On the current view, then, there is no reason not to reinterpret sentence (19) as this 
sentence
(19)' Of that person called ‘Frank’: he is happy.
The response strategy, in this case, is to point out that when there are no quantifiers 
 Thanks to Angel Pinillos for bringing this to my attention.23
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present in certain sentences, like sentence (19), there is nothing to trigger reinterpreting it 
as expressing what (19)' expresses, thereby avoiding the implausible result that sentences 
like (19) ought to be reinterpreted into sentences like (19)’. Remember, after all, that we are 
offering an analysis of ‘All Franks’ and its kin, not of ‘Frank’ the name, so not only is there a 
response to this objection, it misses its mark at any rate. 
6.3 The Return of the Predicativist Objection
As previously asserted, we are to understand the offered paraphrases as analytically 
related to their original versions. This leads to the natural question of whether all that has 
been done is to have offered yet another predicativist account of proper names. The line of 
reasoning here is as follows: since, on the domain specifier view, the occurrence of ‘Franks’ 
in a sentence like
(4) All Franks are real chatterboxes 
is understood as having the same meaning as the phrase ‘Of those people named ‘Frank’:’, 
we have simply offered a meta-linguistic understanding of the use of ‘Frank’ in quantified 
constructions that is still, at bottom, predicative, since being a person named ‘Frank’ is itself 
an attribute, a meta-linguistic attribute perhaps, but an attribute nonetheless. 
However, the previous objection rests on two separate mistakes. Correspondingly, 
there are two separate responses to this objection. 
The first response notes that the previous line of reasoning simply ignores the fact 
that the current semantic account has it that the instances of domain specification in 
sentences (4)'-(7)' are instances of non-compositionally determined devices of reference. 
Analyzing the domain specifiers in (4)'-(7)' as expressing attributes, then, is just to 
misunderstand the proposal. The offered paraphrases do not give a compositional analysis 
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of the complex constructions containing proper names in the original sentences (4)-(7) at 
all.
Furthermore, to revisit a point made earlier, one of the assumptions of the previous 
objection is that the domain specifiers in sentences (4)'-(7)' are analyses of the meanings of 
the names occurring in sentences (4)-(7). But this is simply false. The domain specifiers are 
intended as analyses of names coupled with a quantifier. There is no semantic one-to-one 
correspondence between the names in the original constructions and in the offered 
paraphrases. Complex phrases like ‘Of those people named ‘Frank’:’ are intended to be 
equivalent in meaning to the complex phrase ‘All Franks’. Since we are rejecting the idea 
that names can combine with quantifiers in the same manner as predicates can, we must 
make sense of the entire complex ‘All Franks’, not simply part of that complex. The domain 
specifier analysis is not offering a theory of the semantic value of a proper name; it is not 
offering a theory of the meaning of ‘Frank’ in the complex phrase ‘All Franks’ at all.
6.4 The Indeterminacy of Reference Objection
The last objection concerns the fact that in the case of sentences like (5) and its 
paraphrastic version (5)’, there is no way to get a determinate domain of discourse to which 
the relevant domain specifier could refer, given that the domain specifier itself does not 
specify a specific set, but rather a range of sets. However, we can still believe that there is a 
fact of the matter about which specific domain is at issue in uttering a sentence like (5)’. We 
can suppose that while the domain specifier itself is indeterminate, it is merely epistemically 
indeterminate. Again, we can rely on some resources from Kripke. We can think of domain 
specifiers that refer to one or more individuals as akin to a Kripke-style descriptive name in 
that they refer to a specific domain in any given instance, even if we are not acquainted with 
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that domain; the entire purpose of a descriptive name is to allow us to refer to something 
with which we are acquainted only by description, without knowing which individual satisfies 
it. Likewise, a domain specifier that is non-specific with respect to how many individuals are 
contained therein allows us to refer to a domain by description without knowing which 
individuals might fit that description.
7. Conclusion
In conclusion, The domain specifier view is a defensible view of many of the predicative 
uses of proper names. If it is correct, we can now begin to move on from one of the current 
controversies concerning the correct semantic analysis of proper names, and explore fresh 
alternatives.24
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